The war against Ukraine has accelerated transformations in Russia’s ideological machinery. In an attempt to rationalize the immense human cost and suffering, Russia increasingly presents itself as a ‘civilization-state’ on a messianic mission against the collective West. Gulnaz Sibgatullina, assistant professor at the University of Amsterdam, explains how Russia has progressively escalated this mission, using its rhetoric to reframe global ideological debates. Paradoxically, the Kremlin’s anti-liberal and anti-colonial positioning coexists with accusations of imperialism and colonialism by ethnic minorities within Russia.
People walk past a New Year decoration - Kremlin Star, bearing a Z letter, a insignia of Russian troops in Ukraine, in front of the Monument dedicated to Heroes of the WWI, in western Moscow, on December 26, 2023. Photo: Alexander Nemenov / ANP / AFP
The protracted continuation of Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine, launched in February 2022, has not only devastated Ukraine but also profoundly impacted the aggressor state, even as the Kremlin strives to maintain a façade of ‘business as usual’ and shield its population from the direct impact of the war. Demographic changes driven by migration fluxes and high death rates on the front line, economic strains resulting from an overheated war economy, and the suppression of civil society marked by intensified crackdowns on independent media and human rights organizations—are only the most visible consequences.
More insidiously, the war has accelerated transformations in Russia’s ideological machinery, reshaping both its domestic governance and foreign policy. While these transformations have roots in earlier years, they have notably accelerated as Russia’s estrangement from Western markets and international political platforms deepens under the sanctions regime. Collectively, they indicate a consolidation and hardening of the Kremlin’s ideological foundations, which had previously been characterized by fluidity and competition among related, yet distinct, ideological currents.
Domestic ideological shifts
Russia’s initial inability to secure a swift victory in its ‘special military operation’ in Ukraine revealed the state apparatus’s ideological unpreparedness to justify a conflict of this magnitude. Early official narratives—focused on ‘denazification‘ of Ukraine and resisting NATO expansion—struggled to gain broad resonance among the Russian population. As of December 2024, the regime has yet to settle on a singular, coherent justification for the war, instead deploying a fragmented mix of themes: portraying Russia as a power challenging US/NATO hegemony, addressing the grievances of the Soviet Union’s collapse by reclaiming Ukrainian territories deemed integral to Russian statehood, and invoking diffuse cultural imperatives such as defending traditional values and preserving the memory of the Soviet victory in World War II.
While these narratives may seem disparate, they are becoming increasingly intertwined as the Kremlin faces mounting pressure to construct a more coherent ideological project. This pressure is driven by two key factors. First, crafting a persuasive ideology has become a matter of national security. While the number of outspoken anti-war activists remains limited—largely due to the repressive nature of the regime—the war itself lacks broad popular support. Since 2022, the state has doubled down on ideology-building, even if that entails experimenting with conflicting discourses while systematically suppressing alternative narratives to ensure public compliance and loyalty.
Second, the ongoing war has prompted a broader reconsideration of events spanning the entire post-Soviet period—encompassing the Chechen wars, the 2008 conflict with Georgia, the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. This re-evaluation is taking place both within Russian-speaking communities Russian-speaking communities and among observers. What becomes clear is that these series of conflicts are becoming harder to explain solely through the lens of pragmatic geopolitical interests. In both 2014 and 2022, a deeper ideological purpose underpinned the aggression, as reflected in Putin’s Valdai speech of 2014 and the Foreign Policy Concept of 2023. Whether this ideological purpose was a driving force from the outset or a retrospective justification is ultimately of secondary importance. What matters is that these events have been normalized as inevitable and become instrumental in consolidating the Kremlin’s ideological framework, anchoring its authority in a narrative of historical and cultural destiny.
This ideological framework is encapsulated in the concept of Russia as a ‘civilization-state,’ a notion that supplants the traditional idea of the ‘nation-state.’ Crystallizing in its present form during 2022-23, this concept draws from conservative currents in Russian imperial intellectual history, Orthodox eschatology, and Soviet-era notions of (Eurasian) civilization. These ideas, while not unique to the current regime, have coalesced under Vladimir Putin, particularly since his third term began in 2012.
The ‘civilization-state’ framework transcends the temporally and ethnically constrained modern nation-state model, positioning Russia’s identity within a longue durée perspective that extends back to pre-modern history. Within this narrative, the conflict with Ukraine is reframed as part of an enduring civilizational struggle—whether against the West, the Antichrist, or the forces of moral decay and nihilism, depending on the rhetorical need.
As the invasion grinds through its third year, the civilizationist narrative continues to exert a certain appeal. By embedding the war within a grand historical and moral framework, it seeks to rationalize the immense human cost and suffering, casting them as part of a messianic mission. Present sacrifices are reframed as contributions to a timeless, collective endeavor that transcends individual lives and immediate hardships, offering a sense of purpose in the face of an uncertain future. This ideological construct is designed not only to justify the state’s actions but also to provide a moral rationale intended to foster societal cohesion during a protracted conflict.
In the context of political repression, however, it remains challenging to assess the actual effectiveness of this discourse. While much analysis focuses on the economic incentives driving Russians to participate in the war, research suggests that practical understandings of the war’s tangible impact on everyday life can and do coexist with more abstract notions of larger, geopolitical struggle. This duality allows the state’s narrative to persist, even amid the personal and collective toll of the conflict.
The civilizational framework also aims to unify the Russian citizens, regardless of religion, ethnicity, or social status, under a shared historical and cultural mission. However, this approach carries risks. In recent years, Russian officials have adopted a more inclusive understanding of russkii (Russian), moving beyond narrow ethnonationalism to reinforce the notion of historical unity among Eastern Slavs—Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians. During the war, a video allegedly made by the Russian Ministry of Defence featured soldiers from ethnic minorities declaring their ethnic identity and adding ‘I am russkii’, which highlighted a further shift toward constructing a supra-ethnic identity that extends beyond Slavic roots.
This strategy of diminishing ethnic distinctiveness seeks to counter critiques of the flawed federation model. However, the stark inequality across federal subjects and the lack of autonomy for regional elites to independently address local issues continue to fuel social frustration in Russia’s regions. Furthermore, while the Russian state portrays its longue durée historical perspective as the embodiment of a grand civilization, a number of voices—particularly from ethnic minority groups—see it as a manifestation of unchallenged imperialism.
The Russian President Vladimir Putin joins a class of Conversations about Important Things during his visit to a school in Kyzyl on September 2, 2024. Foto: Vyacheslav Prokofyev / AFP / ANP
Nevertheless, the gradual institutionalization of the civilization-centered framework is evident in state-led initiatives such as DNA of Russia, Civilizational Code, and Conversations about Important Things. While there were earlier attempts to define the essence of Russian culture and statehood, the scale and intensity of these programs have grown significantly since 2022, particularly in their focus on the educational and cultural spheres. Crucially, these efforts position Vladimir Putin’s leadership as significant but not indispensable to the framework’s continuation. By presenting the civilization-state narrative as an essence of the Russian statehood, these initiatives ensure that dismantling it would require more than a mere political transition—it is likely to demand a profound reconfiguration of more and more entrenched cultural and institutional norms.
Crucially, the civilization framework is inherently relational: it needs the Other to define itself. By emphasizing the distinctiveness of local cultures and civilizations, Russia positions itself as a counterpoint to Western liberalism’s emphasis on universal principles. This juxtaposition reveals a deeper ideological clash that transcends domestic politics, embodying two rival visions of global order: one advocating for the pluralistic coexistence—or, in a more ‘realist’ interpretation, the continuous struggle—of autonomous civilizations, and the other asserting the universality of liberal democratic ideals as the cornerstone of international relations and governance. Over the past two and a half years, Russia has progressively escalated its challenge to this liberal foundation, using the civilizational rhetoric also to reframe global ideological debates.
Foreign Policy Realignments
The invasion of Ukraine triggered Russia’s economic and political isolation on the global stage. Yet the Kremlin quickly adapted, reallocating resources to alternative domains of influence such as information networks, paramilitary initiatives, and religious diplomacy. In the months since the invasion, two key tendencies in Russia’s foreign policy have become increasingly clear: a strategic soft power pivot toward the Global South—primarily focusing on Africa and, to a lesser extent, Latin America—and a determined effort to create alternative international platforms.
Since 2022, Russia has made significant investments in strengthening its economic, political, and cultural ties with the Global South, leveraging thereby the civilization-state narrative to position itself as an anti-liberal and anti-colonial power. The emphasis on the uniqueness of civilizations directly challenges the political, economic, and predominantly cultural influence of liberal democracies, framing them as neo-colonial powers that undermine and erase local traditions and indigenous forms of governance. This shift is underscored by Vladimir Putin’s rhetorical transformation: in just two years, he invoked ‘(neo)colonialism’ twice as often—102 occurrences in 625 statements—than he had in the previous 21 years of his presidency, where the term appeared 51 times across 6,771 statements. Importantly, the anti-colonial discourse promoted by the Russian state to audiences abroad coexists with accusations of imperialism and colonialism levelled against the Kremlin by ethnic minorities within Russia.
Despite the obvious tension between Russia’s external positioning and domestic realities, the anti-colonial narrative has considerable potential to resonate with nations disillusioned by the inequities of the post-Cold War international order. These frustrations have been further exacerbated by controversies over Covid-19 and Mpox vaccine distribution and the tensions surrounding the Israel-Palestine conflict. By emphasizing themes of anti-colonial resistance, Russia relies on the positive memories of the Soviet leftist internationalist project that are still cherished in many regions.
While Russia lacks the economic capacity to provide direct support to the countries in the Global South on the scale of China, US or the EU, the Kremlin initially relied on Evgeni Prigozhin’s expansive network of paramilitary operations, resource extraction ventures, and media projects to project influence (Prigozhin’s galaxy). However, after Prigozhin’s mutiny in June 2023 and the subsequent collapse of the Wagner Group, the Russian officials have shifted their focus more heavily toward advancing anti-colonial discourses through a broader network of dispersed ideological entrepreneurs and soft power strategies.
These soft power strategies include information networks, notably state-sponsored platforms like Sputnik and RT. In the last two years, campaigns by these networks have expanded beyond traditional online and TV formats to encompass outdoor advertising, prominently featuring local power figures advocating resistance against Western neo-colonialism. On the ground, information dissemination is further bolstered by numerous ‘Russian Houses’ and offices of the ‘Russian World,’ which receive direct support from the Russian state.
Religion has become another important tool in Russia’s soft power strategy, with both the Russian Orthodox Church and Islamic institutions playing key roles in advancing the Kremlin’s ideological vision. These religious entities act as conduits for Russia’s civilizational rhetoric, positioning the state not only as a geopolitical actor but also as a moral and cultural force. They also offer distinct strategic advantages within Russia’s foreign policy. By engaging directly with local communities, these institutions frequently present themselves as apolitical actors, fostering trust and reciprocity that overtly state-sponsored initiatives might find difficult to achieve.
While it remains unclear whether host populations in the Global South are driven by ideological alignment or pragmatic considerations (or both) in their receptivity to these institutions, it is evident that Russia’s positioning as a defender of traditional family values - framed primarily in opposition to LGBTQ+ rights - combined with opportunities for education and employment in Russia, and bolstered by a massive information campaign, is likely to start bearing fruit beyond favourable UN votes.
Closely tied to its soft power pivot in the Global South, another visible transformation in Russia’s foreign policy since 2022 has been its intensified participation in and promotion of alternative international platforms. These platforms, ranging from high-level engagements like BRICS summits to initiatives that engage grassroots movements, such as the Forum on Multipolarity and the Russophiles Congress, serve multiple purposes. Beyond helping Russia defy its isolation, these platforms actively engage in the production of ideological and political alternatives.
Firstly, they act as counterweights to Western-led forums, which many countries in the Global South criticize as exclusive and unrepresentative. By convening diverse actors, critical of the liberal world order, these Russia-led platforms—however symbolic—contribute to fostering new alliances among authoritarian states, conservative NGOs, and ideologues. These gatherings facilitate the exchange of political practices and ideas, enabling participants to collectively challenge Western-centric frameworks.
Secondly, by hosting these platforms domestically, Russia reinforces its effort to position itself as a central player in an alternative, multipolar global order. Since 2024, the Kremlin has increasingly employed the term ‘global majority,’ inverting the concept of democratic support and framing Russia as a representative of widespread grievances and aspirations. This rhetorical strategy underscores Russia’s attempt to redefine global norms, presenting itself as a champion of the disenfranchised and disillusioned within the existing world order.
Advertisement for Russian media outlet RT in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, with a quotation from former Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere. July 2024. Photo: X.
Conclusion
The war has entrenched a new reality in Russia, characterized by ideological consolidation at home and strategic realignment abroad. Domestically, the Kremlin has embraced the civilization-state narrative, redefining the country’s past as a glorious and eternal struggle to legitimize the war and mitigate public anxieties about an uncertain future. This narrative reframes economic discontent and societal toll of the war through religious, historical, and cultural lenses, embedding the conflict within a broader ideological framework.
However, this trend is not unique to Russia. Similar patterns can be observed in far-right populist movements across Europe and the United States, where historical narratives are weaponized to redirect economic grievances and social insecurities. The backlash against progressive leftist ideals and the use of cultural or religious tropes to address socio-economic anxieties reflect a broader global phenomenon, signalling a convergence of strategies among authoritarian and populist actors worldwide.
Internationally, Russia leverages its Soviet-era connections and the frustrations of the Global South to position itself as a hub of ideological resistance. Despite its limited economic capabilities, it seeks to gain influence through its narrative of being the voice of anti-imperial struggle. This positioning resonates—or at least garners recognition—in regions disillusioned with the inequities and double standards of the post-Cold War international order. For many in the Global South, where frustrations with persistent post-colonial power structures run deep, Russia’s defiance increasingly presents itself as an alternative to Western-dominated norms.
