The crash of an Azerbaijan Airlines flight due to a Russian missile last December led to public tensions between Azerbaijan and Russia. The response from Baku was assertive yet calculated. Agha Bayramov, assistant professor International Relations at the University of Groningen, argues that, despite eroded trust, Azerbaijan has nothing to gain from antagonizing Russia. Instead, Baku has increased its leverage over Russia in recent years while the West fails to understand the precarious position in which Azerbaijan has found itself.
The crash site of Azerbaijan Airlines flight J2-8243 in Kazakhstan. Photo: Kazakhstan's emergency situations ministry / ANP / AFP
Last December, Azerbaijan Airlines Flight J2-8243, carrying 67 passengers from Baku to Grozny, crashed near Aktau, Kazakhstan. The tragedy left at least 38 dead. The plane crashed after a Russian surface-to-air missile exploded near the aircraft mid-flight, which Moscow did not admit to. The crash triggered political tensions between Azerbaijan and Russia, with Azerbaijani officials criticizing Moscow’s denial, lack of transparency, and the decision to keep airspace open amid tensions. President Ilham Aliyev demanded formal acknowledgement and accountability from those responsible.
Putin's apology without admission of guilt
The crash of the Azerbaijani Airlines flight exposed significant vulnerabilities in Baku’s relationship with Moscow and fueled resentment against Russia in Azerbaijani society. Russia’s initial response to the crash — marked by denial and delays — further eroded trust. President Ilham Aliyev noted that immediate transparency and accountability after the crash could have mitigated the fallout. Meanwhile, the Azerbaijani government rejected Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov’s offer of financial assistance. Aliyev insisted on an official apology and reparations, not assistance.
Later, Putin apologized to his Azerbaijani counterpart 'for the fact that the incident happened in Russian airspace'—without taking the blame for the crash. In an interview one day later, Aliyev said that the first demand of the Azerbaijani side (i.e., a formal apology) was fulfilled. However, the president emphasized that Azerbaijan expected more than vague expressions of regret, stressing the importance of the other three demands: acknowledgement of guilt; punishment of those responsible; and compensation for the Azerbaijani state, injured passengers, and crew.
Azerbaijan's foreign policy: a cautious balancing act
The aftermath of the plane crash relates directly to the political relations between Russia and Azerbaijan. The latter's geographical and political location — caught between the European Union and Russia — defines its foreign policy approach and strategic choices. Azerbaijan’s foreign policy exemplifies strategic autonomy — a calculated effort to balance relations among powerful actors without succumbing to the dominance of any single one. The country prioritizes its political independence by avoiding alignment with any regional blocs or unions, thereby preserving its autonomy in foreign relations.
Azerbaijan has leveraged this strategic in-betweenness to establish itself as an essential energy corridor and transit hub, notably through projects such as the Southern Gas Corridor and the Middle Corridor. Baku aims to limit Russian influence, whereas Russia uses tools of leverage to ensure Azerbaijan does not drift too far from its orbit.
It is important to note that Baku does not view the missile strike as an intentional act by Russia. At the same time, Baku’s response has been assertive, emphasizing expectations of reciprocity in bilateral relations. Russia’s reaction to the plane crash was perceived as an attempt to downplay the incident, avoid responsibility, and delay a proper response. In terms of Azerbaijan’s relations with Russia, this incident will likely influence Baku’s future dealings with Moscow. Moving forward, Baku will reflect on 'lessons learned' after Russia’s response to the crisis.
Russia, in its turn, did not like Azerbaijan’s assertive position and public statements blaming Russia. In response, shortly after the crash Russia halved the duration of its visa-free regime for Azerbaijani citizens. Baku’s reaction was immediate, announcing similar restrictions on Russian citizens’ stays in Azerbaijan.
However, this situation does not mean Azerbaijan will abandon pragmatism in its approach to Russia. While the plane crash marks a significant moment in Azerbaijan-Russia relations, Baku is unlikely to turn the relationship into a hostile one. Azerbaijan recognizes that escalating tensions with a neighbouring country like Russia would neither align with its strategic interests nor lead to any positive outcomes in the near or longer term. Azerbaijani-Russian relations, including trade and transport, have not suffered. Azerbaijani Airlines still flies to several destinations in Russia, thereby also serving the big Azerbaijani diaspora in Russia.
Considering its geographical scope, power, history and economy, it is necessary for Azerbaijan to maintain pragmatic relations with Russia. Economic ties and trade relations further reinforce this view, as many still see Russia as a key market and partner despite broader geopolitical shifts. For example, this year Azerbaijan and Russia have signed an agreement on cooperation for the development of transit cargo transportation along the international transport corridor 'North-South'.
'Strategic partnership' with eyes on Karabakh
The characterisation of Moscow-Baku relations as 'strategic allies' is often linked to the 2022 Declaration on Allied Interaction, which has been misunderstood and misrepresented in public discourse, locally and internationally. When Azerbaijan signed the agreement in 2022, referring to both countries as 'allies' within the framework of this declaration, Baku’s primary goal was to create leverage for regaining full sovereignty over the remaining parts of Karabakh, which were under the control of Russian peacekeeping forces.
It is important to note that when each side refers to the relationship as 'strategic', it carries different implications. For Baku, the relationship is 'strategic' in maintaining direct and reciprocal ties with Moscow while safeguarding Azerbaijan’s core interests, particularly security. Azerbaijan has consistently resisted closer integration with Russia’s security and economic alliances, such as the CSTO or the Eurasian Economic Union. Membership in such partnerships traditionally signified a country's reliance on Moscow.
The document on 'Allied Interaction' includes several articles emphasizing respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, aligning with Azerbaijan's objectives at the time. This agreement also served as a diplomatic tool for Azerbaijan to protest and demand an end to actions by the Russian side in Karabakh, such as the use of Armenian toponyms by Russian peacekeepers, the deployment of humanitarian aid directly to Armenian-populated areas without Azerbaijani oversight, and the organization of celebrations for significant Russian national events in the region.
President Aliyev kneels down in front of the flag of Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh in October 2023, after Azerbaijan retook control of the region. Photo: Azerbaijani Presidential Press Office / ANP / AFP
Furthermore, Azerbaijan used the agreement to object to Russia’s allowance of Armenian military forces to remain in Karabakh under the guise of security concerns, despite their presence being deemed illegal. Azerbaijan also criticized Russian peacekeepers for engaging with the self-proclaimed representatives of Karabakh Armenians in ways that appeared to treat the region as a sovereign or independent entity, an attempt to create a 'mini patron state' under Russian influence. Azerbaijan viewed these actions as undermining its sovereignty, favoring Russian and local Armenian interests, and a sign that Russia was trying to assert its role as a security provider for the local Armenian population – thereby laying the groundwork for a prolonged Russian presence in Karabakh. Baku intended for the 2022 agreement to diplomatically frame and challenge such actions, simplifying the process of classifying them as hostile and demanding their cessation.
War in Ukraine reshuffles the cards
The war in Ukraine altered the calculus, weakening Russia's position in the Southern Caucasus and increasing Azerbaijan’s leverage over Moscow. Azerbaijan has strengthened relations with Ukraine in response to the 2022 Russian invasion, but has not fully alienated Russia. More significantly, Azerbaijan seized this moment strategically, and began gradually but firmly pushing Russian forces out of Azerbaijani territory before the end of their first five-year mandate as peacekeepers.
Azerbaijan made incremental advances into areas of Karabakh that were under nominal Russian peacekeeping control, slowly improving its military and territorial positions. These actions caught Moscow off guard, but it chose not to respond forcefully, fearing that confronting Azerbaijan — or straining its relationship with Turkey, a close ally of Baku — would create additional problems at a time when Russia was already stretched thin by the war in Ukraine.
Since the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s definition of 'strategic partnership' has become more fluid and minimalist, focusing primarily on preventing Azerbaijan from joining Western sanctions or providing military support to Ukraine. In other words, Azerbaijan does not cut ties impulsively but rather uses every occasion to negotiate a better position.
Considering this, it can be argued that neither Azerbaijan nor Russia can take their relationship for granted, as it continuously shifts depending on regional developments. Azerbaijan’s approach toward Russia is shaped by a permanent sense of insecurity, stemming from Russia’s historical dominance over the South Caucasus. This means that Baku does not blindly trust Moscow but instead makes tactical decisions to avoid antagonizing Russia while still seeking to limit its influence.
West oversimplifies relations with Russia
In the West, since the invasion of Ukraine, relations with Russia are often oversimplified into binary categories, dividing countries into 'Russia’s allies' or 'pro-Western' based on how hawkish they are toward Moscow. This approach fails to consider the complex strategies employed by countries in the Caucasus or Central Asia — particularly those bordering Russia — to manage bilateral relations while minimizing the risk of potential hostility from Moscow. Each country has its approach to balancing these risks, with varying levels of success, but the principle remains the same: to protect their independence and core interests.
The idea of Russia as a 'strategic partner' does not resonate with the Azerbaijani public
In Azerbaijan’s public perception, Russia is framed in terms of a colonial past and a new national identity following the disintegration of the USSR. Moscow’s actions during key events – such as the First Karabakh War and the subsequent occupation of Azerbaijani territories – have fueled such perceptions. Public dissatisfaction deepened further when Russia deployed its forces as 'peacekeepers' in Karabakh. As a result, the idea of Russia as a 'strategic partner' does not resonate with the Azerbaijani public.
Azerbaijani-Russian relations are best understood through the lens of 'pragmatic diplomacy', rather than long-term strategic alliances built on deep trust. This approach implies that Baku and Moscow engage in cooperation when it is mutually beneficial, but do not share ideological or unconditional commitments to one another. Unlike Armenia, Azerbaijan does not rely on Russia for long-term security guarantees or economic dependence, and Moscow does not see Baku as an unquestioning ally. Instead, both sides engage in issue-based bargaining, where cooperation occurs only when each side receives tangible benefits. From Moscow’s perspective, Russia deliberately maintains a degree of unpredictability in its policies, ensuring that Azerbaijan remains cautious and unable to fully distance itself from Moscow.
What is Azerbaijan's position on Ukraine?
Azerbaijan's policy toward Ukraine is one of the strategic components of its multi-vector foreign policy. By supporting Ukraine (diplomatically, with humanitarian aid, and energy), Azerbaijan demonstrates its commitment to international norms, such as sovereignty and territorial integrity, without alienating Russia entirely. Azerbaijan has pledged over 40 million dollars in humanitarian aid to Ukraine since 2022. This assistance is part of a broader effort by Baku to provide tangible support to Ukraine in critical times. Beyond financial contributions, Azerbaijan has also supplied free fuel for Ukrainian doctors and firefighters.
Meeting between Ukrainian president Zelensky and Azerbaijani president Aliyev in January 2025. Photo: Ukrainian Presidential Press Service / ANP / AFP
In line with Baku’s multi-vector foreign policy, from the first days of the war Azerbaijan conducted a calculated balancing act designed to keep a number of options open at once. Even Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and leading Western countries thanked the Azerbaijani leadership for its support on several occasions. On the other hand, Azerbaijan did not join Western sanctions against Russia and went a long way to avoid straining relations with Moscow. Even the Russian bombing of Azerbaijan’s honorary consulate in Kharkiv did not receive a harsh response from Baku.
Growing leverage over Moscow
Since 2020, there has been a growing misperception in the West of Azerbaijan-Russia relations. The West has scrutinized Russia’s role during the Second Karabakh War, the deployment of Russian peacekeepers to the region, and their eventual early withdrawal. Many in the West have viewed these developments as part of a coordinated plan between Azerbaijan and Russia, dismissing Azerbaijan’s growing leverage over Moscow and underestimating Russia’s vested interests in the region — where Russia has historically never left voluntarily. For example, Azerbaijan provides Russia with energy and transport cooperation when it serves its economic interests, but simultaneously strengthens its partnerships with the EU and Turkey.
Azerbaijan is skillfully leveraging Russia’s vulnerabilities to advance its national interests
Meanwhile, Azerbaijan purchases arms from Russia but simultaneously strengthens military ties with Turkey to reduce dependence on Moscow, and diversifies its military equipments with purchases from Israel and Italy. In other words, Azerbaijan does not follow a pro-Russian or anti-Russian foreign policy but instead adjusts its stance based on emerging circumstances.
It is becoming more apparent to the West that Baku is neither a junior partner to Moscow nor part of its orbit. Instead, Azerbaijan is emerging as an independent actor, skillfully leveraging Russia’s vulnerabilities — particularly after Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine — to advance its national interests. This includes compelling Russian forces to withdraw from the Karabakh region, demonstrating Azerbaijan’s growing influence and autonomy. This shift in understanding could open opportunities for Azerbaijan to reinvigorate its relations with the West, which have been strained with several EU members and, to some extent, with the United States.
Azerbaijan-Russia: a fragile but calculated relationship
The Azerbaijani Airlines crash has served as a stark reminder of the fragility and limitations within Azerbaijan-Russia relations. While the incident triggered political tensions, Baku’s response has been assertive yet measured, seeking accountability without abandoning its broader strategy of pragmatic engagement. Despite the erosion of trust, Azerbaijan continues to prioritize strategic stability, recognizing that maintaining working ties with Moscow remains essential due to geography, economic interdependence, and regional dynamics.
The West should avoid framing Azerbaijan’s relationship with Russia in binary terms
The plane crash may not break the relationship, but it has certainly reshaped its terms—with Baku now more cautious, assertive, and determined to defend its sovereignty in dealing with the Kremlin. Azerbaijan’s ability to maintain this delicate balance will be critical not only for its stability and security but also for navigating the future regional dynamics in the shadow of a diminished but still assertive Russia.
For the West, this tragedy should serve as a reminder of the precarious position of countries like Azerbaijan which must navigate a complex relationship with Moscow while striving to maintain their sovereignty and independence. The West should avoid framing Azerbaijan’s relationship with Russia in binary terms as either aligned with Moscow or the West, and acknowledge the nuanced and multifaceted strategies Baku employs to protect its security.
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