Milorad Dodik, the leader of Republika Srpska within Bosnia and Herzegovina, has ideologically aligned himself with Russia and Israel to undermine the EU’s authority, writes Matilda Flamme*. After calling for his region to become independent from Bosnia, Dodik was charged with undermining the country’s constitutional order. Last week, Bosnia's state police attempted but failed to arrest Dodik, further deepening the nation’s political crisis.
People endorsing the President of Republika Srpska Milorad Dodik chant during his rally of support in Banja Luka, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 26 February 2025. The rally followed the court's verdict to sentence Dodik to one year in prison and ban him from public office for six years. Photo: Nidal Saljic / ANP / EPA
Republika Srpska, one of the two entities within Bosnia and Herzegovina, occupies a paradoxical position: it is formally bound to Bosnia and Herzegovina through the 1995 Dayton Agreement that ended the Bosnian War, but also increasingly estranged from its institutions, norms and international orientation. Over the past decade, under the leadership of Milorad Dodik, Republika Srpska has repositioned itself, operating as a sovereign actor. Over the past decade, it increasingly aligned itself with a broader bloc of illiberal states which is primarily characterized by shared narratives about history, victimhood, and resistance to Western liberalism.
In the spring of 2025, Dodik made a series of symbolic visits to Russia and Israel, strategically using themes of anti-fascist resistance and collective trauma in order to strengthen his political identity and regional alliances. His interaction with Russian and Israeli memory cultures shows that Dodik is not just seeking international recognition — he is trying to rewrite the post-war history of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Rewriting Bosnia and Herzegovina's post-war history
In Russia, Dodik met with President Vladimir Putin and laid flowers at the grave of the Unknown Soldier, which is a key place in the national myth of victory over fascism. He also confirmed his participation in the celebration of Victory Day in Russia on May 9th 2025. These actions were not just diplomatic gestures, but had a deep symbolic meaning: referring to Soviet anti-fascism, Dodik positioned himself within the framework of the ‘Russian world’ – a geopolitical and moral space defined by opposition to Western liberalism and historical revisionism.
In this context, memory serves as an excuse: just as Russia claims ‘denazification’ in Ukraine, Dodik seeks to present the history of the Bosnian Serbs as a continuation of the anti-fascist struggle, invoking the legacy of the Yugoslav Partisans to recast Serb victimhood and resistance during the 1990s war in a more heroic light. This narrative reframes the Serbs not as aggressors in the Bosnian War, but as ongoing defenders against fascist threats - a rhetorical strategy aimed at domestic consolidation and rapprochement with Moscow.
By visiting memorials to the victims of the Israel-Palestinian war and mentioning the suffering of the Jewish people, Dodik tried to draw a parallel between Jewish sacrifice and the Serbian experience of the 1990s — specifically, the portrayal of Serbs as victims of international injustice, NATO aggression, and the alleged distortion of historical facts during and after the Bosnian War (Figure 1). This maneuver not only reinterprets the Serbs as historical victims, but it also allows Dodik to strategically engage with Israel as a gateway to American conservative circles. In this sense, his activity on social media reinforced this positioning: a social media post expressing unconditional support for Trump's political trajectory, calling the U.S. president a ‘peacemaker’ among Jews and Palestinians, as well as Russians and Ukrainians, was widely interpreted as an implicit gesture to Donald Trump and his supporters. Through such performative diplomacy, Dodik builds a geopolitical narrative in which Republika Srpska unites with influential players outside the EU under the banner of a common historical trauma and ‘true’ anti-fascist values.
Milorad Dodik at the Site of the Nova Music Festival Massacre, where over 360 people were murdered by Hamas on October 7, 2023. Photo: @MiloradDodik
Coordinated strategy
Together, these two visits demonstrate a wider, coordinated strategy. Specifically, Dodik draws on Russia's tendency to delegitimise international legal institutions and reframe state actions as misunderstood or unfairly condemned by the West. One of the most resonant manifestations of this policy was the denial of the genocide in Srebrenica, recognised by the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, calling it ‘an arranged tragedy’ and a ‘realisation of plans of some western countries to put collective guilt on the Serbian people’.
‘By denying the genocide in Srebrenica, Dodik undermines the entire framework of reconciliation on which Bosnia was built after the war’
This narrative is reinforced by institutional measures: in April 2024, the Srebrenica Genocide Center in Potočari was temporarily closed due to the termination of protection and funding from the Republika Srpska authorities, which highlighted the vulnerability of the Muslim population and the sabotage of memory mechanisms at the entity level. By denying the genocide, Dodik not only casts doubt on the historical fact, but also undermines the entire framework of reconciliation on which Bosnia was built after the war, known as the Dayton Agreement. This peace agreement ended the Bosnian War in 1995 and created Bosnia and Herzegovina as a sovereign state with a complex system of power sharing between its ethnic groups. Part of the legitimacy of this system is based on the idea of a shared commitment to peace, justice, and recognition of past atrocities. Dodik's denial of the history of Srebrenica challenges this common understanding and seeks to rewrite the history of the war, questioning the reliability of the foundations of the state.
Fears of disintegration
At the same time, Dodik continues to threaten the declaration of independence of the Republika Srpska as a step towards anschluss with Serbia. The fear of the disintegration of a complex ethnopolitical structure, the resurgence of violence and the involvement of external powers in a regional crisis makes Dodik practically untouchable – a person with whom engagement is preferred over direct confrontation.
Dodik continues to threaten the declaration of independence of the Republika Srpska as a step towards anschluss with Serbia
Indicative in this context is the role of Russia as Serbia's key foreign policy patron in the issue of non-recognition of Kosovo's independence — a highly contentious matter in the Balkans, where Kosovo, a former province of Serbia, unilaterally declared independence in 2008 following the 1999 NATO intervention and years of ethnic conflict. Russia has consistently supported Serbia’s position on this issue, backing it diplomatically on all international platforms and blocking Kosovo’s accession to the UN. In this context, Milorad Dodik consistently articulates a similar logic, but in the opposite direction by recognising the ‘referendums’ in the Russian-occupied Ukrainian regions of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia and Kherson. This kind of discourse is closely linked to the ‘Kosovo precedent’, which Vladimir Putin has repeatedly referred to since 2014, when he justified the annexation of Crimea. In his speech on March 18, 2014, he argued: ‘The Crimean authorities relied on the well—known Kosovo precedent, a precedent that our Western partners created with their own hands…’
Thus, the ‘Kosovo precedent’ becomes a universal justification for the subsequent violation of international legal norms by both the Kremlin and its closest allies in the Balkans, reinforcing the mythology of ‘brotherhood’ between Serbs and Russians as peoples allegedly jointly opposing the West and its ‘double standards’. This myth is being actively used to shape public opinion in Serbia, where support for Russia far exceeds support for the European Union. Recent surveys indicate that Russian President Vladimir Putin is viewed more favorably by Serbs than any other global leader. A striking 94% of respondents consider Russia a genuine ally, while only 11% hold the same view of the European Union — even though the EU remains Serbia’s largest financial contributor. Additionally, 65% of Serbs believe NATO or Ukraine itself, rather than Putin, bears responsibility for the war in Ukraine, and 82% oppose the idea of Serbia aligning with EU sanctions against Russia. This orientation of public opinion reflects the effectiveness of the embedded ‘brotherhood’ mythology, which contributes to the normalisation of deviations from the European course.
Russian President Vladimir Putin (C) shakes hands with Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik (R) upon their meeting at the Kremlin in Moscow, Russia, 01 April 2025. Photo: Mikhail Tereshchenko / ANP / EPA
Undermining the constitutional order
However, Dodik's strategy is increasingly in direct conflict with international and Bosnian institutions designed to protect the foundations of the Dayton Agreement. The key actor in this confrontation is Christian Schmidt, the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina appointed by the European Union and the United Nations. His job is to ensure that Bosnia maintains its delicate balance between different ethnic groups and adheres to the principles of justice, democracy and peace. As an official with exclusive powers under the Dayton Agreement, he can repeal national laws and remove officials who threaten the implementation of the peace agreement. In response to attempts by the Republika Srpska authorities to limit the jurisdiction of state courts and reject the priority of central-level laws, Schmidt strongly criticised Dodik and directly accused him of systematically undermining the constitutional order.
This confrontation took on a legal character in the summer of 2023, when the Prosecutor's Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina filed charges against Dodik for disobeying the decisions of the High Representative Christian Schmidt, which, in accordance with the country's legal order, are binding. In particular, Dodik signed decrees canceling the decisions of the Constitutional Court and Schmidt on the territory of Republika Srpska. The High Representative repealed these decrees, but Milorad Dodik ignored his decision. At the same time, Christian Schmidt amended the Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina, criminalising non-compliance with the decisions of the High Representative. As a result, Milorad Dodik was sentenced to one year in prison and disqualified from holding public office for six years after he continued to ignore the decisions of the High Representative. Last week, Bosnian state police tried to arrest Dodik in the town of East Sarajevo. However, they failed to do so because they were stopped by Dodik’s own armed police forces. Against this background, the potential involvement of international structures, including Interpol, is being discussed if judicial challenges continue to be ignored.
Republika Srpska armed police officers stand guard in East Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 24 April 2025. The heavy police presence followed Bosnia's state police (SIPA) officers' attempt to arrest President of Republika Srpska Milorad Dodik on late 23 April 2025. Photo: Harun Muminovic / ANP / EPA
An alternative moral geography
There is now an awkward stalemate regarding Dodik’s legal status. Although formal accusations have been made and sanctions imposed, enforcement mechanisms for these decisions remain limited, illustrating how vulnerable the institutional guarantees of the Dayton Order are in the face of nationalist mobilisation and Russian foreign policy patronage. Dodik's challenge to Schmidt's authority is not only an internal Bosnian issue; it is also closely linked to his close ties with Moscow. Defending Russia's interests, Dodik not only resists the efforts of the High Representative, but also uses Russia's support to strengthen his position in the fight against international pressure. With each passing month, Dodik's position becomes more precarious: caught between growing legal pressure and his own rhetoric, he increasingly relies on external support from Russia and Israel, as well as symbolic politics such as his visits to these countries, to maintain his authority.
With each passing month, Dodik's position becomes more precarious
Ultimately, Milorad Dodik's symbolic speeches in Russia and Israel illustrate a deliberate effort to create an alternative moral geography - one that bypasses the European Union and rethinks historical alliances based on shared notions of sacrifice, anti-fascism, and resistance to liberal norms. Using memory politics, Dodik is not only distancing Republika Srpska from the EU, but also joining a network of actors, such as Russia, Israel, and forces supporting Trump in the United States, who are challenging the foundations of the post-Cold War liberal order.
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*For safety reasons, we publish the above article in anonymised form. Matilda Flamme is not the real name of the author.