The future of Armenia is caught between two conflicting visions of nation and state. While Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan strives to redefine his country based on existing borders, many Armenians seem unwilling to let go of the much larger historical Armenian homeland. In promoting his 'Real Armenia' agenda, Pashinyan faces the risk of losing popular support, writes Leonardo Zanatta. 

People visit the Tsitsernakaberd Armenian Genocide Memorial in Yerevan with the Ararat mountain seen in background. April 16, 2015. Photo: Karen Minasyan / ANP / AFP

Since mid-2023, Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has been promoting a vision for the country’s future that clearly departs from the traditional perspectives that have shaped the country’s politics since its independence in 1991. Central to this vision is the idea that the Armenian people must distinguish between the present-day Republic of Armenia, called the 'Real Armenia,' and the 'Historical Armenia,' understanding that the prosperity of the former depends on moving beyond emotional attachments to the latter. According to Pashinyan, especially after the fall of Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023, the two concepts have become not just incompatible but often in direct conflict.

Real vs Historical Armenia

To explain the difference between Real Armenia and Historical Armenia to someone less familiar with Armenian history, a useful approach might be to show them a picture of Mount Ararat. This majestic mountain, visible from Yerevan on clear days, appears on Armenia’s coat of arms, inspires popular brandy and cigarette brands, and even serves as a common male name, including that of the current foreign minister, Ararat Mirzoyan. Many places throughout the country, including a province, villages, streets, and schools, also carry its name. However, Mount Ararat is located outside Armenian territory, just across the internationally recognized border with Turkey. This is the result of ever-changing political control over eastern Anatolia, which until the early twentieth century was an integral part of the Armenian homeland. This ended in 1915, with the Armenian Genocide. 

In June 2023, Armenia’s prime minister, speaking about Ararat, declared that this mountain symbolizes the 'duality that exists in each [Armenian]: historical Armenia and real Armenia.' The pressing question for Armenians today, he stated, is: 'Should the Real Armenia serve the Historical Armenia or should the Historical Armenia serve the real Armenia?' Less than a year later, he explained that Real Armenia is the entity 'that has an internationally recognized territory and internationally recognized borders and, realizing this fact, has the self-awareness of a full and respectable member of the international community'. By contrast, Historical Armenia is an emotionally charged notion that links today’s struggles with the deep wounds of the past. Even though the Armenian Genocide occurred more than a century ago, its legacy continues to shape Armenian political consciousness.

'Should the Real Armenia serve the Historical Armenia or should the Historical Armenia serve the real Armenia?'

More recently, Armenians have faced the loss of another place they had called home for centuries: Nagorno-Karabakh. This small mountainous enclave, internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan, had been under the de facto control of its ethnic Armenian population through the breakaway Republic of Artsakh since the early 1990s. After Azerbaijan reclaimed much of its territory in the 2020 Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, Russian peacekeepers were deployed to prevent further clashes. However, in late 2022, Azerbaijan blockaded what little was left of Artsakh and, with the Kremlin distracted by its war against Ukraine, launched a swift military operation in September 2023, seizing full control of Nagorno-Karabakh and triggering a mass exodus of Armenians to Armenia.

Given the close political and cultural ties between Azerbaijan and Turkey, these events have been perceived as a continuation of the trauma their ancestors experienced in eastern Anatolia. According to Prime Minister Pashinyan, this legacy defines Historical Armenia and weighs heavily on the nation, limiting its ability to move forward and threatening its security.

Peace: so close, yet so far

Although the dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh has effectively ended, with Pashinyan affirming on several occasions that Armenia has no territorial claims against Baku, a formal peace treaty between the two countries has yet to be signed. Until such a treaty is in place, the risk of renewed escalation or a wider conflict that could threaten Armenia’s very existence cannot be dismissed.

In mid-March, both Baku and Yerevan stated they had completed the text of a peace agreement, raising hopes that a lasting resolution might finally be within reach. But new demands from the Azerbaijani side have since cast doubt on whether the treaty will be signed soon. The current draft focuses on establishing diplomatic relations and includes three main requirements: the renunciation of territorial claims, the withdrawal of legal cases, and the removal of foreign peacekeeping forces.

Two major issues remain unresolved and will require separate negotiations. The first is the complete demarcation of the Armenia-Azerbaijan border, which dates back to Soviet-era administrative boundaries and remains undefined in many places. In April 2024, the two countries agreed to delimit a small section of the border, but a comprehensive agreement is likely to take considerable time. The second issue concerns reopening regional transport routes, including a proposed corridor connecting mainland Azerbaijan to its exclave Nakhichevan through Armenia’s Syunik region. Baku refers to this as the 'Zangezur Corridor' and has pushed for its implementation since the 2020 war. While Armenia supports improving regional connectivity and modernizing Soviet-era infrastructure, it rejects the idea of an extraterritorial corridor, which it sees as a threat to its sovereignty and territorial integrity. The use of the term 'Zangezur Corridor' by Azerbaijan adds to Armenia’s concerns by invoking nationalist claims over southern Armenian land.

Defining Real Armenia through foreign policy

Pashinyan’s push for a peace deal with Azerbaijan is driven by more than just the urgent need to protect Armenia’s survival. It reflects his broader vision for the country’s future foreign policy. In April 2024, when he told the National Assembly that clinging to the idea of Historical Armenia prevents Armenians from achieving true independence, leaving them dependent on 'outside sponsors and saviors', he was clearly referring to Armenia’s reliance on Russia for security guarantees.

Armenia and Russia are both members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, or CSTO, the Russia-dominated counterweight to NATO. The Kremlin maintains a significant security presence in Armenia, as it maintains a military base near Gyumri - Armenia’s second-largest city - with a lease agreement extending to 2044. Yet, relations between the two governments have worsened in recent years. Moscow’s failure to respond to Azerbaijani incursions into Armenian territory after 2020 and its inaction during Azerbaijan’s 2023 offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh deepened the strain. By September 2023, Pashinyan called Armenia’s heavy dependence on Russian security a 'strategic mistake' and suspended Armenia’s participation in the CSTO by February 2024.

Pashinyan: Armenia’s heavy dependence on Russian security was a 'strategic mistake'

Amid escalating tensions with Russia, Armenia has sought closer ties with the West. In September 2023, it joined military exercises with the United States. By April 2024, Armenia secured a €270 million investment package from the European Union to strengthen energy resilience, along with $65 million in U.S. aid to support economic diversification. Then in January 2025, the National Assembly passed the EU Integration Act, marking the start of Yerevan’s alignment with European Union membership criteria.

Meanwhile, Armenia is also working to improve relations with Turkey. Since 1993, the Armenian-Turkish border has been closed due to the legacy of the Armenian Genocide and Turkey’s support for Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Today, both countries recognize the potential benefits of reopening the border. For Turkey, normalization would expand its influence in the South Caucasus where it already has strong ties with Georgia and Azerbaijan. For Armenia, it could reduce military and economic dependence on Russia.

However, Ankara insists that normalization depends on a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Turkey’s close political and economic ties with Baku, including its reliance on Azerbaijani energy, shape this position. A previous attempt to restore diplomatic relations in 2008 failed mainly due to Azerbaijani objections. But since the 2020 war, there has been cautious progress: Turkey and Armenia have opened air routes, appointed special envoys, and engaged in talks aimed at restoring diplomatic ties. A symbolic gesture came in February 2023 when Armenia sent humanitarian aid to Turkey after a devastating earthquake despite the border remaining closed. In June 2025, Pashinyan paid a working visit to Istanbul where he met with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to discuss the latest developments in the region.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan (C-R) and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan (C-L) during a welcoming ceremony in Istanbul, Turkey, 20 June 2025. Pashinyan is in Turkey for a one-day visit. Photo: Murat Cetinmuhurdar / ANP / EPA

Real Armenia within domestic policy

Beyond shaping his post‑conflict foreign policy, the 'two Armenias' debate also works towards consolidating Pashinyan’s legitimacy at home and helps dismantle the political system built by his predecessors and rivals Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan. As the 2026 parliamentary elections approach, peace with Azerbaijan, normalization of relations with Turkey, and deeper integration with Western institutions are becoming the pillars of his campaign. In stressing the contrast between Real Armenia and Historical Armenia, Pashinyan is deliberately positioning himself as the leader of a new era, making himself the antithesis of the old guard.

Both Kocharyan and Sargsyan, originating from Nagorno‑Karabakh, built their political legitimacy on the back of the conflict with Azerbaijan and the memory of the Armenian Genocide applying these narratives to unite and mobilize their base. Although Pashinyan defeated them in the 2021 snap parliamentary election, they remain powerful voices in parliament. They have relentlessly criticized Pashinyan accusing him of betraying national interests in his handling of the 2020 war, his apparent acceptance of Azerbaijan’s full control over Nagorno‑Karabakh in 2023, the concessions he is prepared to make to Baku, and his growing distance from Russia.

Pashinyan is deliberately positioning himself as the leader of a new era, the antithesis of the old guard

Meanwhile, Armenia’s Prime Minister appears to be locked in a personal confrontation with another deeply influential institution: the Armenian Apostolic Church. The friction with Catholicos Karekin II began when in April 2020 he, as the head of the Church, publicly demanded the release of Robert Kocharyan, who was charged in 2018 in connection with the crackdown on the 2008 post-election unrest. Since then, Pashinyan has come to view Catholicos not as a spiritual leader but as a political opponent aligned with the old guard.

Tensions escalated significantly in May 2024 following Pashinyan’s decision to hand over four border villages to Azerbaijan in a bid to jump‑start demarcation talks and signal Armenia’s readiness for peace. Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan, head of the Tavush Diocese, led mass protests in Yerevan calling for Pashinyan’s resignation, framing his policies as a betrayal. Pashinyan accused the Catholicos of orchestrating the protests and aiding his political rivals.

In June 2025, Pashinyan used his social media channels to publicly allege Karekin II of violating his vow of celibacy by fathering a child. Days later he made headlines by stating that the Armenian state must play a decisive role in electing the next Catholicos and that, in his opinion, candidates should undergo an integrity check. Around the same period, Pashinyan's wife Anna Hakobyan leveled accusations against several priests claiming they had broken their vows and were involved in pedophilia. Meanwhile, Russian-Armenian billionaire Samvel Karapetyan, owner of the Tashir Group conglomerate and of the 'Electricity Networks of Armenia' company, which Pashinyan is seeking to nationalize, has been arrested. His lawyers said the arrest was triggered by Karapetyan’s remarks defending the Armenian Apostolic Church during an interview, where he criticized the government’s attacks on religious institutions.

A few days later, Archbishop Galstanyan was also arrested along with fourteen others on charges of plotting terrorism and attempting to seize power. Media outlet Civic.am reported that the alleged coup attempt involved clergy members and opposition figures with links to Russia. In fact, one reason Pashinyan views the Catholicos as a political obstacle are his ambiguous ties with the Kremlin. In late 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin awarded Karekin II a medal for fostering cultural relations between the two countries. Adding to this, Karekin II’s brother, Yezras, leads the Russian Diocese of the Armenian Apostolic Church and has been connected to pro-Russian militias, including the Arbat Battalion, which was allegedly involved in last year’s coup attempt.

An ambiguous and hazardous gamble

At first glance, the 'two Armenias' debate raised by Pashinyan might seem symbolic and focused mainly on matters of political identity. However, it carries profound implications for Armenia’s future. In foreign policy, it involves the looming threat of renewed conflict with Azerbaijan, the desire to reduce reliance on Russia, which was once seen as a protector and still enjoys cordial ties with the Armenian Apostolic Church, the push to strengthen ties with the West, and efforts to normalize relations with Turkey.

Domestically, the debate raises serious questions about the government’s ability to maintain popular support amid growing tensions with the Armenian Apostolic Church and the upcoming parliamentary elections in 2026. This debate has morphed into a confrontation between the old pre-revolution establishment, such as Kocharyan, Sargsyan, and Karekin II, and the new forces meant to succeed them. As the year unfolds and the elections approach, tensions are expected to rise, making the situation increasingly intense and potentially unstable.