Over the past few years, Belarusian dictator Lukashenka abandoned his long-standing balancing act between Russia and Europe in favour of Moscow. Meanwhile, the opposition moved in the other direction and aligned ever closer with Europe. As a result, geopolitical orientation gradually became the main fault line of Belarusian politics, writes Victoria Leukavets, post-doctoral researcher at the Center for Baltic and East European Studies (CBEES).
Members of the Belarusian minority and supporter wait for freed prisoners in front of the US Embassy in Vilnius, Lithuania, 13 December 2025. Photo: ANP / EPA / Valda Kalnina
For much of Aliaksandr Lukashenka’s rule Belarus pursued a foreign policy often described as 'multi-vectoralism'. While maintaining close political, economic and military ties with Russia, Minsk periodically sought limited engagement with the European Union and other international partners. This balancing strategy allowed the Lukashenka regime to extract economic benefits from Russia while preserving a degree of political autonomy and maintaining channels of communication with the West. Today, that model no longer exists.
The events of 2020 and 2022 fundamentally transformed Belarus’s political landscape and accelerated the emergence of two Belaruses with distinct geopolitical visions. The fraudulent presidential election of August 2020, the subsequent mass protests, and Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 reshaped the incentives and priorities of Belarusian political actors. As a result, geopolitical orientation has become the principal dividing line among Belarusian elites.
On one side stands the Lukashenka regime, which has become increasingly dependent on Russia politically, economically and militarily. On the other side stand the Belarusian democratic forces, which have gradually consolidated around a European orientation and increasingly view Belarus’s future through the prism of integration with European political and economic structures. The May 2026 elections to the Coordination Council, the proto-Parliament in exile – demonstrate that this divide has become more deeply institutionalised over time.
The end of Lukashenka’s multi-vectorism
Since coming to power in 1994, Lukashenka sought to build a close alliance with Russia which would provide to it access to discounted energy resources, preferential trade arrangements and substantial economic subsidies. At the same time, Minsk periodically attempted to improve relations with the European Union, particularly during periods of tension with Moscow.
This balancing strategy reached its peak after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Belarus positioned itself as a platform for dialogue between Russia and Ukraine and sought to improve relations with Western partners. The EU responded by gradually expanding engagement with Minsk and suspending a number of sanctions. However, the post-election crisis of 2020 fundamentally altered this equilibrium.
Belarus positioned itself as a platform for dialogue between Russia and Ukraine
The unprecedented scale of anti-government protests created the most serious challenge to Lukashenka’s rule since he came to power. Faced with mass demonstrations and growing international isolation, the regime increasingly relied on Russian support for its survival. Moscow provided political backing, economic assistance and security guarantees at a critical moment.
The consequences were profound. The Belarusian regime gradually abandoned its traditional balancing strategy and became significantly more dependent on Russia. Subsequent developments, including the forced landing of a Ryanair flight in 2021, the migration crisis on the EU border and Belarus’s involvement in Russia’s war against Ukraine, further accelerated this process.
Belarus as Russia’s closest ally
The transformation of Belarus-Russia relations since 2020 has been visible across multiple dimensions.
Military cooperation has expanded significantly. Belarusian territory has become an increasingly important component of Russia’s regional security architecture. The deployment of Russian tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus, the strengthening of the Regional Grouping of Forces and the signing of new security agreements have deepened military integration to unprecedented levels.
Economic dependence has also intensified. Russia remains Belarus’s largest trading partner and principal export market. Following Western sanctions, Belarusian companies have become increasingly reliant on Russian logistics networks, financial institutions and markets. The Belarusian defence industry has also become more deeply integrated into Russia’s military-industrial complex, with significant portions of production linked to Russian procurement.
The transformation of Belarus-Russia relations has been visible across multiple dimensions
At the same time, the Lukashenka regime has sought to present itself as pursuing an independent foreign policy. Official discourse frequently emphasises cooperation with China, Africa, Latin America and emerging powers. Belarusian officials increasingly speak about a 'multipolar world' and the importance of the 'Global Majority'.
Yet these narratives should not obscure the underlying reality. Unlike previous periods, when Belarus sought to balance between Russia and the West, the country today possesses significantly less strategic autonomy. Russia remains the indispensable partner for the survival of the regime.
The evolution of Belarus’s domestic political system reflects this reality. Constitutional changes adopted after 2020, the strengthening of the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly and the emergence of the pro-government Belaya Rus party have further consolidated the political order that emerged in the aftermath of the 2020 protests. These institutions are designed not only to strengthen regime stability but also to embed the existing geopolitical orientation within the state apparatus.
For the Lukashenka regime, close alignment with Russia is no longer simply a foreign policy preference. It has become a core mechanism of political survival.
Lukashenka and Putin meet in the Kremlin in May 2026. Photo: Kremlin.ru
From democratic protest to European vision
The trajectory of the Belarusian democratic forces has been very different. The opposition movement that emerged in 2020 was not initially driven by geopolitical considerations. Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s 2020 presidential campaign focused on democratic reforms and the organisation of free and fair elections. Questions concerning relations with Russia or the European Union played a relatively minor role. This approach reflected political realities inside Belarus. The opposition sought to unite supporters with diverse ideological and geopolitical preferences around a common democratic agenda.
However, Russia’s support for Lukashenka during the protests and, above all, the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine transformed the political environment. The use of Belarusian territory for Russian military operations generated significant concern among many Belarusians about the country’s sovereignty and future independence. Russia increasingly came to be viewed as a difficult partner. As a result, the democratic movement gradually adopted a more explicit European orientation.
Zelensky's ultimatum
After Russia's withdrawal from northern Ukraine in May 2022, Belarus has remained an important staging area for Russian forces, as well as a facilitator of Russian drone and missile attacks against Ukraine. On June 18, 2026, Ukrainian president Zelensky warned Minsk that it should remove the communications equipment used to support the strikes within one week or Ukraine would take action itself. It remains to be seen whether Ukraine will follow up on this ultimatum. Spokesperson for the Kremlin Dmitri Peskov said that Lukashenka and Putin would discuss Zelensky's remarks in 'the foreseeable future'.
Tensions between Belarus and Ukraine have increased significantly over the past few months. The United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, headed by Tsikhanouskaya, handed Ukrainian foreign minister Andrii Sybiha a thirty-page document reporting on domestic signs that Lukashenka might be shifting towards a wartime posture, possibly preparing to enter the war with Ukraine.
Commander of the Ukrainian drone forces, best known under his nom de guerre 'Magyar', previously threatened that the first 500 targets in Belarus were already penciled out, should Minsk decide to join forces with Russia against Ukraine.
This shift became particularly visible after 2022. Democratic actors increasingly framed Belarus’s future in terms of integration with European political, economic and legal structures. The adoption of the Declaration on the Future Membership of Belarus in the European Union in 2023 represented an important milestone in this process.
Thus, the democratic forces and the Lukashenka regime increasingly diverged in their geopolitical outlooks after 2022, with the former orienting themselves towards Europe and the latter becoming more deeply embedded within Russia’s political and security structures.
What the 2026 Coordination Council elections reveal
The May 2026 elections to the Coordination Council provide the most recent indication of the geopolitical preferences of Belarusian democratic elites. A total of 2,113 Belarusians participated in the vote, compared to more than 6,700 in 2024. Although turnout was lower than during the first direct elections in 2024, the results reveal important trends within organised opposition politics.
The clear winner was the coalition led by Pavel Latushka and the Movement for Freedom, which secured 42.3 per cent of the vote and 34 of the Council’s 80 seats. The second strongest force was European Choice, which won 11 seats. The movement Volya secured 8 seats, while the youth-oriented movement Nastup also obtained 8 seats. Other groups represented in the Coordination Council include the United Civic Platform (6 seats), Enough to Be Afraid (5 seats), Your Voice (4 seats) and Belarusians of Action (4 seats).
Several conclusions can be drawn from these results.
First, they confirm the dominant position of Pavel Latushka and his allies within the Coordination Council. Latushka has consistently advocated strong support for Ukraine, a firm stance toward the Lukashenka regime and closer cooperation with European institutions. The scale of his coalition’s victory suggests that these positions continue to enjoy substantial support among politically active Belarusians.
Second, the elections demonstrate the extent to which a European orientation has become institutionalised within the democratic movement. The two largest factions – Latushka’s coalition and European Choice – together hold a majority of seats and explicitly advocate closer integration with Europe.
More broadly, most factions represented in the Council support stronger cooperation with European institutions and favour reducing Belarus’s dependence on Russia. While they differ on questions of strategy and institutional design, few challenge the broader consensus regarding Belarus’s long-term geopolitical direction.
The elections reveal important trends within organised opposition politics
Third, the elections highlight the growing importance of security issues within opposition politics. The strong performance of Volya, a movement associated with Belarusian volunteers fighting alongside Ukraine, reflects the impact of the war on political attitudes within the democratic movement. Questions of security, defence and resistance to Russian influence now occupy a much more prominent place in opposition discourse than they did before 2022.
At the same time, the elections revealed important challenges. Lower turnout reflects growing fatigue within parts of the Belarusian diaspora and broader difficulties facing political institutions operating in exile. Nevertheless, the successful organisation of another competitive election demonstrates the resilience of Belarusian democratic structures despite continued displacement and transnational repression by the Lukashenka regime.
Most importantly, the results confirm a broader trend that has become increasingly visible since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. While some opposition groups continue to disagree on tactics and organisational questions, geopolitical orientation is no longer one of the main sources of division. Unlike the Belarusian opposition of the 1990s and 2000s, today’s democratic forces are united to an unprecedented degree around a pro-European vision for Belarus.
Implications for Europe
The growing divergence between the Lukashenka regime and the democratic forces in exile carries several implications for European policymakers.
First, Belarus should no longer be treated as a politically homogeneous actor. Two competing geopolitical projects now offer fundamentally different visions of the country’s future.
Second, geopolitical orientation is likely to remain a central issue in Belarusian politics even after eventual political transition. The key question is no longer whether Belarus should balance between East and West, but rather how future democratic governments would manage relations with both Europe and Russia.
Third, support for exiled Belarusian democratic institutions remains crucial. The Office of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, the United Transitional Cabinet and the Coordination Council continue to perform representative and political functions despite operating in exile. Their development will prove important in any future democratic transition.
Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya shows a portrait of Nobel Peace Prize winner Ales Bialiatski, who is imprisoned in Belarus, during the annual October Lecture organised by RAAM. Photo: Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya's Office
Finally, European policymakers should recognise that support for European integration among Belarusian democratic forces is increasingly linked to concerns about sovereignty and security. For many Belarusians, Europe represents not only a model of governance but also a safeguard against excessive dependence on Russia.
Competing geopolitical futures
The most important consequence of the 2020 and 2022 critical junctures is not simply Belarus’s growing dependence on Russia. It is the emergence of two competing geopolitical futures for Belarus.
One future is represented by the Lukashenka regime: an authoritarian Belarus embedded within Russia’s political, economic and security structures. The other is represented by the democratic forces: a sovereign and democratic Belarus that increasingly sees its future in Europe.
Six years after the protests of 2020, geopolitical orientation has become the principal fault line of Belarusian elite politics, and the struggle between these two visions is likely to shape Belarus’s domestic and foreign policy trajectory for the years to come.
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