Ukraine has no other choice than to cope with the comeback of Donald Trump. After three years of war and wavering support from the West, the country under siege is faced with a new reality. Trump's approach to the war could be a risky experiment, writes Mykola Riabchuk exclusively for RAAM. But Ukrainians are also disappointed with the policies of Biden, Scholz and other western leaders.
Zelensky, Trump and Macron after a meeting at the Elysée Palace in Paris, December 2025. Photo: Julien de Rosa / ANP / AFP
A year ago, when the eventual presidential candidate Donald Trump promised to end the Russian-Ukrainian war within 24 hours, hardly anybody familiar (more or less) with the situation on the ground could have taken the promise at face value. Simple logic and rational thought clearly suggested that Russia would not be willing to accept such a deal unless it achieves its ultimate goal: the dismantling of the Ukrainian state and the erasure of its nation, while Ukraine would not be eager to yield to the pressure, since its very existence is on the table, clearly non-negotiable.
For Russians, there is no reason to compromise as long as they feel they are advancing and Ukraine is forced to retreat, while the collective West still seems feckless, disarrayed and despicable.
For Ukraine, there might be a reason to suspend the fighting, to freeze the conflict and put off the request for justice until a next Russian perestroika somewhere in the future. But with a lack of viable security guarantees against further Russian advances, the prospects of an armistice make little sense.
No doubts about the Kremlin's intentions
There has always been and still is a theoretical possibility that Donald Trump will opt for the seemingly most simple solution and stop any assistance to Ukraine. This is very unlikely, however, because neither the Congress nor the expert communities nor the American society at large would approve and would accept the disastrous consequences of such a move – both for U.S. security and its international reputation. And even then, Ukrainians would not give up anyway but continue resisting desperately, by default, since they have no alternative. Russian politicians do not hide their genocidal intent – to extinguish both the Ukrainian state and the nation (‘demilitarize’ and ‘de-Nazify’, in their code-words), and Russian practices in the occupied territories do not leave any room for doubt about the Kremlin's methods and goals.
Continued Ukrainian resistance under such circumstances would certainly be even more exhaustive and costly than now, but Ukrainians would definitely persist: their trust in the leadership still is high, their determination is strong, and their own arms programs are being developed in full steam. No matter how important the American support (40% of all military supply by now) still is, one third of the armament is already produced by Ukrainians themselves (and the figure is steadily growing), while about 30% is provided by Europeans. Non-military support from the U.S. is notably lower, lagging behind the combined assistance from other states. In terms of percentage of GDP (0.4%), American allocations to Ukraine rank only 16th, far behind many other states that allocate more than one and sometimes even two per cent of their GDP.
Support for Trump’s bluff
Mr. Trump has clearly bluffed with his ‘peace-making’ promise (as with many other promises, to say the truth) – it was an irresponsible and fantastical idea, even at first glance. But the desire for simple solutions and political miracles was so high that the people not only voted Trump into the presidency of the U.S. but also expressed globally their high expectations and probably trust in him. A representative survey, carried out in 24 major countries last November (shortly after the US presidential elections), revealed that support. A strong majority of respondents in India (82 vs 5%), Saudi Arabia (57 vs 19%), and China (52 vs 14%), declared that the election of Trump is a good thing for peace in the world. The same opinion was expressed by a strong plurality of respondents in Russia (45 vs 10%), South Africa (42 vs 28%), Turkey (38 vs 30%), Brazil (37 vs 31%) and even in Ukraine (33 vs 18%). A similar majority or plurality in the same countries believe that Trump will help to achieve peace in Ukraine: from 65 vs 11% in India and 61 vs 4% in Russia to 48 vs 16% in Turkey and 39 vs 35% in Ukraine itself. The same respondents, likewise, recognize Trump’s presidency as a good thig for their own country: 84 vs 6% in India, 61 vs 10% in Saudi Arabia, 49 vs 8% in Russia, 46 vs 18% in China. Again, the Ukrainian hopes for Trump (26 vs 20%) appeared to be the highest in Europe, which was generally (and exceptionally) sceptical about Trump’s presidency: from 54 vs 15% in the U.K. to 38 vs 22% in the EU, and 34 vs 23% in Switzerland.
Disrespect or hypocrisy?
In a commentary on these results, Ivan Krastev of the Centre for Liberal Strategies in Sofia hypothesized that the global approbation for Trump (besides Europe and South Korea) may reflect not only the natural enthusiasm for a winner or sincere belief in his peace-making zeal and efficacy, but also something more complicated and interesting. ‘Trump’s open disrespect for international rules is viewed by many in the non-western world as preferable to the unbearable hypocrisy of the previous liberal administration. Under Trump, the US will finally become a normal great power — imperial but not crusading. It will no longer pretend to be better than all other countries but rather act on the assumption that it is stronger than them’, writes Krastev.
In particular, this might be the primary reason for Russian enthusiasm about Trump. As Krastev further contends: early moves by the Trump team signal that he has decided to demonstrate his power not by confronting America’s adversaries but by subduing Washington’s allies. Donald Trump’s claims on Greenland and Canada, and Elon Musk’s tweets calling for regime change in the UK, are the clearest indications of this gambit.
EU member states have every reason to worry that Washington’s approach to them will echo former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev’s recent statement that ‘it is necessary to help any destructive processes in Europe’.
Disappointment in the West
Ukrainians are more optimistic about Trump than all other Europeans, but still not as positive as all surveyed non-Europeans (with a graphical exception of South Koreans).
The Ukrainian optimism, even though mild, still looks strange against Trump’s past ambiguous if not overtly insulting remarks about Ukraine and about Zelensky personally, let alone his threats to cut off the aid to Ukraine and strike a deal with Putin. Maybe his latest talks about ‘peace through strength’ offset his past verbal faux-pas, but most likely it was Ukrainians’ general disappointment in many Western leaders and the incumbent American leadership in particular that led them to cautiously embrace Donald Trump as a possible (and, actually, the only available) alternative.
Within one year, between November 2023 and November 2024, Ukrainians’ trust in all Western politicians declined by 5 to 10%, the only exception (surprisingly) being Emmanuel Macron, whose rating increased from 54 to 58%. The most significant decreases were recorded in Ukrainians’ attitudes toward Olaf Scholz (the level of trust declined from 61 to 37%) and Joe Biden (from 82 to 55%). The level of trust in Trump, though still quite modest at 45%, might be considered as the flipside of Ukrainians' disappointment in Biden who, in Ukrainians’ eyes, was too cautious in observing Putin’s ‘red lines’ and too slow in delivering the crucial military aid. Or, as the director of the Ukrainian New Europe Center Alyona Getmanchuk harshly put it: ‘Biden was killing Ukraine softly; his policies [of supporting the country ‘as long as it takes’] led to Ukraine’s slow, suffocating defeat’.
BBC correspondent Steve Rosenberg reads Russian newspapers about Trump 2.0. Video: BBC
Trump and Putin: two unpredictable leaders
In other words, Ukrainians’ optimism about Trump is not based on confidence but rather on fatigue and despair caused by his predecessors. One may call it ‘optimism by default’, betting on the last chance. The overwhelming majority of Ukrainians (55%, the highest figure among the other international respondents) are in fact undecided: they cannot clearly answer whether Trump’s presidency is going to be a good or bad thing for their country.
Ukrainian politicians probably feel the same uncertainty, even though they try to put on a brave face. The modest optimism seems to stem from the questionable belief that Trump’s recklessness and disrespect for rules might be the best response to the similar features displayed by Putin, who loves to overturn the chessboard at any suitable moment and employs a shameless chutzpah as a major tool and principle of international politics.
Fighting fire with fire and great arrogance with even greater arrogance might be a risky experiment, but Ukrainians have little choice: they must adopt to the precarious situation.
Zelensky’s overtures
Despite their mixed experience with Donald Trump and justifiable bias, they make recurrent overtures to him. It started immediately from after Trump’s victory in November, when Zelensky presumed that the war ‘will [probably] end faster with the policy of this team that will now lead the White House’. The overtures came to a preliminary conclusion with the latest comments by Ukrainian foreign minister Andriy Sybiha, who said: ‘we view the change of power in the U.S. as a new opportunity and an additional chance. I believe we can expect greater decisiveness from the U.S.’.
In a recent interview with the American podcaster Lex Fridman, Volodymyr Zelensky did not spare compliments for Donald Trump and some of his allies, including the notorious Elon Musk who has previously made arrogant statements on both Ukraine and Zelensky himself. ‘I respect him’, Zelensky said. ‘First of all, I respect self-made people, I love such people. Nothing has fallen from the sky; the person has done something himself. I worked myself, I know what it means to earn money, to select talented people, and to do something important... We are very grateful [to Musk] for Starlinks, they helped us. We used them after the Russian strikes, missiles on the energy sector, and problems with the internet. We used Starlinks at the front, in kindergartens, schools, and in various infrastructure. It helped us a lot.’
In the same conversation, Zelensky emphatically contrasted the leadership skills of Trump and Putin. He praised the former for his care of the American people and blamed the latter for sending Russians as cannon fodder to Ukraine only to promote his paranoid ideas.
What's next?
Zelensky, indeed, has very good speechwriters and seems to be quite a good psychologist himself, who perfectly understands that the best way to evoke somebody’s solidarity is to help them identify themselves with the group in need: ‘President Trump will be in the same situation as I was in 2019 — precisely the same situation. I wanted to end the war, and we wanted lasting peace for Ukraine. We had to do this. A ceasefire, exchange people, and then diplomatically return all territories, and we would do this through diplomacy. I wanted to end the war, and we wanted lasting peace for Ukraine.’
But ‘what will happen next with President Trump?’, Zelensky asked. ‘If the ceasefire happens without security guarantees, at least for the territory we control, what does he get? If he manages to make a ceasefire deal and three months later Putin launches a new wave of attacks, what will Trump look like? What will Ukraine look like?’
Security guarantees are Ukraine’s major concern. In a visit to Brussels last month, Volodymyr Zelensky reportedly negotiated with partners on ‘Trump-proof’ measures that would mitigate the risks of his forthcoming return to power. Any truce (or ‘freeze’ of the war), he averred, would be extremely dangerous unless accompanied by effective security guarantees.
This is indeed the biggest challenge for Ukraine’s Western partners. Whereas they consensually agree that ‘peace through strength’ requires much higher military support for Ukraine in order to bring Russia to the negotiating table, the next step – enforcement of the achieved agreements and protection of Ukraine against Russia’s very probable new invasions – remains a hot potato that nobody wants to take care of and responsibility for. ‘Without robust guarantees’, Zelensky maintains, ‘Putin would use any truce to build his forces back up and launch another attack’.
Three years ago, Putin launched the biggest war in Europe since 1945, just because he confused the reality on the ground with the virtual reality of his imperial imagination. Donald Trump may commit a similar mistake, trying to end the war in 24 hours or 24 days, while confusing imaginary Ukraine (and imaginary Russia) with a crude and unmalleable reality. So far, Trump seems to recognize, at least partially, that reality is more complex, and extended the timeframe of his political exorcism from 24 hours to 100 days. Further extensions, however, will be inevitable, in all likelihood.
Four scenarios for better or worse
In a recently published perceptive article ‘Why Ukraine Shouldn't Negotiate with Putin’ Robert Person envisions four broad scenarios of a political-diplomatic settlement of the war.
The first scenario – of a Western complete withdrawal – envisions Ukraine’s crushing defeat that ‘would be a disaster for U.S. interests, European security, and international stability’. The second scenario – ‘a prolonged war of attrition that Ukraine loses’ – boils downs essentially to the first one, though extended in time. The third scenario – and the ‘second best’ possible option – means that ‘the West sends enough help for Ukraine to defend itself while making Russia’s long-run costs unbearable’. And the fourth scenario – the ‘first best’, but hardly achievable – means that ‘the West does whatever it takes to win’.
In many cases, 'non-historical' nations were sacrificed for the sake of perfidious Realpolitik
Nothing is predetermined. Ukrainians can certainly implement both the ‘second best’ and the ‘first best’ scenario if they will get proper international support. But the two other scenarios still loom large, evoking a gloomy memory of Munich 1938, Yalta 1945, and many more cases in which ‘non-historical’ nations were sacrificed for the sake of perfidious Realpolitik.
One can only hope that there are some advisers in Donald Trump’s team who are capable of explaining the danger of simple solutions and drafting a realistic roadmap toward a viable peace. However tempting it might be to exclude the issue of justice from geopolitical calculations and pretend that only big powers are real players and decision-makers, the truth is that ‘non-historical’ nations usually have their own agency, their dignity and identity, and continue to defend them in spite of the obvious and unsurmountable.