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While Russian security services regularly claim to have foiled Ukrainian-organised 'terrorist attacks' and acts of sabotage, a series of high-profile assassinations has exposed the limits of Russia’s vast security apparatus. And the threat may not disappear with the fighting: experts argue that Ukrainian intelligence services are likely to continue pursuing those they consider responsible for the invasion even after the war is over.

The fenced terrace of restaurant 'Balzi Rossi' in Moscow on August 2, 2026, the day after a blast. Photo: Tatyana Makeyeva / ANP / AFP

On August 1, an explosion ripped through the Italian restaurant Balzi Rossi in central Moscow during a private celebration. Five people were killed and 21 injured. Russian authorities immediately described the blast as a terrorist attack but, unusually, refused to identify the victims. Three days later, they still had not publicly disclosed who had been killed or wounded. At the same time, Russia's Foreign Ministry claimed the attack was intended to intimidate Italians living and working in Russia. 

Russian Z-bloggers and independent media reported that the apparent target was Colonel General Aleksandr Chaiko, the recently appointed commander-in-chief of Russia's Aerospace Forces. According to reports, Chaiko survived, his son-in-law was killed and his daughter was seriously injured. Russian authorities have neither confirmed nor denied them.

If confirmed, the attack would mark yet another attempt on one of Russia's highest-ranking military commanders — despite reports that Chaiko had already been placed under enhanced protection following previous attacks on senior officers.

The apparent attempt on Chaiko came less than two months after another senior Russian officer was killed near his home. On June 9, Colonel Damir Davydov, who headed a department responsible for supplying missile and artillery ammunition to the Russian army, was killed when an explosive device attached beneath his BMW detonated in Balashikha, outside Moscow. Russian authorities withheld his identity for hours before independent media established who had been killed. Davydov appears to have been a target of interest to Ukraine: his name was included in the Ukrainian 'Book of Executioners' database, which accused him of involvement in planning and organising Russia’s full-scale invasion.

Davydov's assassination took place less than a kilometre from the spot where, in April 2025, Lieutenant General Yaroslav Moskalik, deputy head of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff, was killed in a similar bombing. According to an ASTRA source, the two officers knew each other personally.

Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began, generals and other senior officers have been killed or targeted hundreds of kilometres from the front line — in apartment courtyards, outside their homes and, now, at what appears to have been a private birthday celebration in the centre of Moscow. According to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), Ukraine has carried out more than 120 assassinations or attempted killings since the start of the full-scale invasion — more than four times the number attributed to Russian intelligence operations.

Colonel Damir Davydov's car after the deadly explosion on June 9. Photo: Maxim Shipenkov / ANP / EPA

What do the assassinations achieve?

Some of the officers targeted since the start of the full-scale invasion occupied positions at the heart of Russia’s military command and war effort.

Yaroslav Moskalik is one of the clearest examples. At the time of his death, he was deputy head of the Main Operations Directorate of the Russian General Staff, a body responsible for operational planning and command of the armed forces.

Yaroslav Moskalik in 2021. Photo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (CC BY 4.0)

Ilya Barabanov, a special correspondent for the BBC Russian Service and co-author of the investigative book Death is Our Business: Russian Mercenaries and the New Era of Private Warfare, described the directorate as 'literally the brain of the Russian army' — making an officer in Moskalik’s position a particularly consequential target.

'Killings like the assassination of General Moskalik produce a very tangible military result,' Barabanov told RAAM, adding that Moskalik’s killing also provoked 'a very nervous reaction' inside the General Staff.

But the impact of the killings extends beyond the loss of individual officers. Alongside their military value, they send a message to other members of Russia’s military establishment that distance from the battlefield does not necessarily guarantee safety, says Barabanov. 

'They demonstrate to all [those Ukraine considers] war criminals that even in the rear they cannot feel safe, and that sooner or later someone will come for them — regardless of whether they remain active military personnel or have already settled into civilian life,' Barabanov said.

'The assassinations demonstrate to all [those Ukraine considers] war criminals that even in the rear they cannot feel safe, and that sooner or later someone will come for them'

'This is humiliating for Putin'

Russian opposition politician Maxim Katz believes the precision of some of the attacks is itself part of their impact on Russia’s military and political establishment. Operations in which explosives reach a specific target in Moscow suggest not only intelligence capabilities but people on the ground capable of tracking targets and preparing attacks.

'To carry out operations like this, you need a lot of eyes and ears in Moscow — an active underground network,' Katz told RAAM. The apparent ability to bring explosives close to a target and strike at a precise moment, he added, 'naturally creates a great deal of nervousness among Russia’s political, military and propaganda elites.'

Russian president Putin with senior Defence Ministry and General Staff officials. Photo: Kremlin.ru

For the Kremlin, Katz argues, there is also a political cost. 

'This is humiliating for Putin. Putin cannot guarantee the safety of the people who work for him,' Katz said. 'For the head of any organisation that is bad, but for a structure of such a mafia-like type, it is particularly bad. It shows that the boss is weak.'

Russian journalist, columnist and writer Oleg Kashin is more sceptical that the assassinations have fundamentally altered the psychology of Russia’s elite.

'I don’t think they traumatise the elite that much, because it is difficult to imagine anything more traumatic than the beginning of the war itself,' Kashin told RAAM. 'Everything happened on February 24, 2022. After that, it is already a kind of afterlife: every time you wake up alive, you probably have to assume that the day has gone well.'

For ordinary Russians, the assassinations appear to have had even less resonance.

'Ordinary Russians simply don’t care about generals — who was killed or why,' Katz said. 'It doesn’t become a story; people don’t talk about it.'

Katz links this indifference to a broader detachment from the military fighting in Ukraine. 'Russians do not identify themselves with the Russian army. They don’t see them as their defenders or heroes,' he said.

'Fighting an underground network when you’re geared towards fighting Navalny doesn’t work very well'

Such a number of Ukrainian operations became possible in a country with one of the world's largest surveillance systems. Russia's federal security service FSB itself presents a completely different picture. Its press service regularly reports that yet another 'terrorist attack,' sabotage, or assassination organized by Ukraine has been prevented.

FSB detains a Moscow resident on July 30 for allegedly transferring cryptocurrency to Ukraine's security service. Screenshot: REN TV / Telegram

Barabanov cautions against taking this package of statements at face value. 'We know that the FSB often reports completely fabricated cases,' he said. 'They periodically create chats themselves, lure people into them, and then report that for some reason they were thwarted — that someone wanted to sign a contract with the Ukrainian Armed Forces, but the FSB intervened in time.'

'I think they actually prevent some things, and they just document others,' Barabanov added. 'They need to submit reports to their superiors.'

Oleg Kashin believes that this number of reports also reflects a shifting definition of what the Russian state considers a security threat.

'There's a natural desire for every individual security service employee to advance their career,' Kashin said. 'Secondly, the concepts and laws of what is and isn't permissible are changing. But we mustn't lose sight of the actual activities of Ukrainian and Western intelligence agencies that are allegedly operating in Russia under the current circumstances.'

The result is a system in which genuine cases of espionage and sabotage coexist with prosecutions for behaviour that, before the war — or before Russia’s broader turn towards repression — might never have attracted the attention of the security services.

On July 27, the FSB detained a Khabarovsk resident on suspicion of treason for passing intelligence to New Zealand. Screenshot: Раньше всех. Ну почти / Telegram

The FSB's public data on anticipated foiled plots also managed to juxtapose several crises it clearly failed to prevent. These failures extend beyond the Ukrainian operations. In March 2024, militants affiliated with ISIS-K attacked Crocus City Hall near Moscow, killing nearly 150 people, despite the US warning the Russian government earlier that month of an imminent extremist attack.

According to Maxim Katz, Russia's security apparatus is focusing on political policing rather than the much more complex task of controlling the reach of covert networks: 'They're trying to fight internal political enemies'. 

Russia's security apparatus is focusing on political policing rather than the much more complex task of controlling the reach of covert networks

'When you can easily get new ranks, a new position, or a bonus for sitting at a computer, and someone is found who wrote an 'incorrect' comment about a terrorist attack and held accountable for justifying terrorism, then, naturally, you have no incentive to look for real terrorists,' Katz said.

The consequences, he argues, extend beyond the failure to prevent Ukrainian operations. 'One of the largest terrorist attacks in Russian history took place at Crocus during the war, and the FSB completely missed it,' Katz said. 'They missed not only the Ukrainian underground, but also the Islamist underground.'

'Fighting an underground network when you’re geared towards fighting Navalny doesn’t work very well,' he added.

After the fire in Crocus City Hall, March 25, 2024. Photo: Ministry of Emergency Situations of the Moscow Region (CC BY 4.0)

Can Russia protect its generals?

Among Russia’s pro-war community, repeated attacks have prompted complaints that Ukrainian intelligence services are operating more effectively inside Russia than their Russian counterparts are in Ukraine.

'The terror campaign by the Bandera special services against the Russian Federation’s generals continues — with nothing comparable being carried out by Russian intelligence,' wrote Maxim Kalashnikov, an ally of imprisoned nationalist and pro-war blogger Igor Girkin. He described the situation as a clear loss of initiative, pointing to the absence of comparable Russian sabotage operations deep inside Ukraine.

'Unfortunately, the enemy’s special services feel at home in the Russian Federation,' another pro-war Telegram channel, Telekanal Stalingrad, wrote. 'The number of generals killed as a result of enemy sabotage is becoming indecent. Why such a trivial task as the physical protection of high-ranking military personnel cannot be solved is unclear.'

However, even effective counterintelligence can face the challenge of a huge number of potential targets. 

'Russia has nearly 1,500 generals. It's impossible to provide security for each of them,' said Barabanov. 'And security alone doesn't solve the problem.'

Instead, the military is increasingly shifting responsibility for personal safety to the personnel themselves. According to Barabanov, Russian service members were recently issued instructions requiring them to change routes, their appearance, and inspect their vehicles before boarding.

'It's strange that such instructions only appeared in the fifth year of the war,' said Barabanov. 'They could have woken up earlier.'

Another vulnerability lies in the notoriously permeable Russian information environment, where databases containing addresses, phone numbers, vehicle registration details, delivery records, and other personal information have repeatedly been leaked.

'In a large country like Russia, all sorts of databases are constantly being leaked, and foreign intelligence agencies can exploit them,' Barabanov said. 'We see people being identified through leaked food delivery databases, others through their cars.'

Even information that people voluntarily publish can become a security threat. Barabanov cited the case of Stanislav Rzhitsky, a former Russian submarine commander who was shot dead in Krasnodar in 2023. His killer may have tracked his movements using the running app Strava.

Stanislav Rzhitsky regularly posted his running and cycling routes on Strava. Photo and screenshot: Strava

'The information environment is simply too permeable to protect yourself from everything,' Barabanov said. 'You can't avoid taking a taxi, ordering food, or using a running app. Well, technically you can—but then you'd have to live in the world of the 1970s.'

Oleg Kashin believes that protection may be uneven. He points to prominent war propagandists such as Vladimir Solovyov and Margarita Simonyan, who, he says, are under heavy security, while some high-ranking military officials continue to live in ordinary apartment buildings and move around with far less visible protection.

Propagandists Vladimir Solovyov and Margarita Simonyan are under heavy security, while some high-ranking military officials continue to live in ordinary apartment buildings and move around with far less visible protection

'Those considered important are guarded quite seriously and well. Those who are not guarded, therefore, are simply easier to kill,' Kashin said. 'The Ukrainian side is killing those whom the Russian authorities themselves do not spare'. 

When security fails, the Russian authorities often seem reluctant to draw attention to it. The identities of those killed are not always immediately revealed, and funerals can take place with virtually no publicity. In Davydov's case, authorities remained silent about the identity of the man killed in Balashikha, and his funeral was later held without a public announcement.

'Sixteen hours of silence about the identity of the deceased speaks volumes,' pro-Russian blogger Anatoly Shariy wrote after the attack.

A threat that may outlast the war

For the Russian officers and officials who have become potential targets, however, the danger may not disappear even if the fighting eventually stops. Barabanov believes the campaign could continue long after an eventual ceasefire or freezing of the conflict.

'This is a long-term story,' he said. 'Even if the conflict is frozen at some point, it is far from certain that operations of this kind will stop. I would be very surprised if the Ukrainian security services stopped this work.'

He compared the prospect to Israel’s decades-long pursuit of Nazi war criminals after the Second World War — an analogy he uses to illustrate how intelligence services can continue pursuing individuals long after a conflict itself has ended.

'I think they have a long list of people whom they consider war criminals,' Barabanov said. 'Intelligence services do not simply stop this kind of work. Even after the fighting ends, whenever and if that happens, they will continue.'

And the potential targets may no longer be wearing uniforms. The Kremlin’s 'Time of Heroes' programme is explicitly designed to move veterans of the war in Ukraine into positions in government and public administration, potentially making previously obscure servicemen more visible long after they have left the battlefield.

For Barabanov, that creates a warning for those now seeking to turn participation in the invasion into a political career.

'Today you take part in the "Time of Heroes" programme and become, say, a deputy mayor somewhere in Stavropol,' he said. 'And later, a scooter might explode outside your building.'