On September 28, Moldovans head to the polls to cast their vote in parliamentary elections. Wedged between NATO and Ukraine, amid political strife and still suffering from Russian destabilisation operations and a breakaway region in the east, Moldova is facing unprecedented challenges. Melania Parzonka, coordinator of the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House, looks ahead at the elections and their potential consequences for the EU accession trajectory.

Emmanuel Macron and Maia Sandu in Chisinau on Moldova's Independence Day on August 27. Photo: Daniel Mihailescu / ANP / AFP

In recent years, Moldova has faced a succession of ‘decisive’ points. It successfully mitigated crises and reaffirmed its pro-European course and democratic reforms. 

In 2023, following a wave of protests triggered by a cost-of-living crisis, it withstood Russia’s attempt to overthrow its government. In both the 2023 local and the 2024 presidential elections, the pro-European Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) and its founder Maia Sandu, respectively managed to secure a majority of votes – though in the latter election only by a small margin – despite skyrocketing inflation and a stalling economy.

Between EU accession and Russian influence

On September 28, Moldova will face yet another decisive moment when its citizens go to the polls for the parliamentary elections. The ruling party PAS will do its utmost to retain its parliamentary majority – a challenging objective based on current polls.

Although Moldova has now enshrined EU accession in its constitution, the progress of the accession negotiations could easily be hijacked by an EU-sceptic government. Georgia’s example shows that a pro-European course is not a given, and Russia still holds influence over the region.

These elections will be critical for Moldova: depending on the result, Moldova may end up struggling to form a lasting government, or in the worst case scenario: derail from its pro-European course entirely. 

To be able to show real progress on the EU accession front, the PAS government was hoping to open some negotiation clusters ahead of the conclusion of its term. This would have deprived pro-Russian parties of the argument that EU accession is merely a sham, and that the EU does not value Moldova as its future member.

Despite these hopes, Moldova’s EU negotiations have been delayed by a Hungarian veto over the accession of Ukraine. 

Is Moldova held back by Ukraine?

Hungary has not objected to progressing on Moldova’s independent accession and has even encouraged decoupling the two countries' accession trajectories. However, Ukrainian president Zelensky has deemed such a solution unacceptable. In a recent meeting between the foreign ministers of Romania and Ukraine, the latter, Andrii Sybiha, reiterated that the security and EU accession paths of both countries are inseparable.

It is not in Moldova’s interest to step on Ukraine’s toes

Although Marta Kos, the EU Commissioner for Enlargement, has not ruled out a decoupling, it is not in Moldova’s interest to step on Ukraine’s toes – progressing as a standalone candidate would strain Moldova’s relations with its neighbour, that is fighting a war of survival.

Unable to move the process forward, the EU has had to look for other ways to demonstrate its support for Moldova’s European course. In July 2025, the first Moldova-EU summit took place, with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa present in Chisinau. The summit was marked by the disbursement of the first tranche of the €1.9 billion EU Reform and Growth Plan for Moldova.

This is not an insignificant sum flowing from the EU, given that Moldova's entire GDP in 2024 was €13 billion. The funds are to be released based on Moldova’s progress on a so-called Reform Agenda, thereby further ‘futureproofing’ Moldova’s EU course.

Similarly, on Moldova’s Independence Day, German chancellor Friedrich Merz, French president Emmanuel Macron and Polish prime minister Donald Tusk paid an official visit at the invitation of president Sandu. They delivered a joint address to express their support for Moldova’s European course.

But as Moldova struggles economically, these diplomatic overtures signal promises which for many are not convincing. 

Energy independence from Russia, but at what cost?

In 2022, following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Moldova suffered huge damage to its economy. This resulted in mass protests and a vote of no-confidence against the government.

Ever since the invasion, Moldova’s economic indicators remain poor. The country shows one of the slowest GDP growths in Europe. In the first quarter of 2025, GDP even decreased by 1.2%. The economic situation is one of the main political issues. As recent polls show – energy security and cost of living rank amongst the biggest concerns for Moldovan citizens.

With the funding flowing from the EU, the Moldovan economy has been able to stabilize over the past year. In the face of rapid weaning off Russian gas, EU subsidies have allowed Moldova to mitigate the energy crisis and invest into alternative energy sources. 

For those who struggle to pay their bills, buying cheap Russian gas can seem like a plausible solution to the population's economic hardships

Now Moldova is independent from energy sources from Russia, directly and indirectly, and buys its electricity on the European market. But in consequence, gas and electricity prices are significantly higher than before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. 

The country’s energy resilience is only a secondary concern for those who struggle to pay their bills – and despite the government’s efforts to highlight the EU’s role in shielding off the energy crisis, for some, buying cheap Russian gas seems like a plausible immediate solution to the population’s economic hardships. 

Foreign-educated leadership fails to reach Moldova's poorer parts

PAS has traditionally struggled with its outreach to poorer parts of Moldova’s population. The party's leading figures are foreign-educated and have a clear international and NGO background – they are not representative of the average Moldovan citizen.

In 2021, PAS’s election campaign focused on delivering social and judicial reforms, improving the cost of living and implementing tougher anti-corruption measures. Even though pensions have been raised by over 100% since 2021, far exceeding the government’s electoral pledges, the increase still has not matched the speed at which basic expenses have grown.

The war in Ukraine and the resulting spiralling inflation give ammunition to those who claim that the government is ineffective

Despite the government’s best efforts, the war in Ukraine and the resulting spiralling inflation has compromised any efforts on improving social support – giving ammunition to those who claim that the government is ineffective.

The EU accession process – now so high on the electoral agenda with the explicit goal to complete it by 2028, as highlighted all over PAS’s website – is often not tangible enough of a promise for a significant part of the population that is struggling to make ends meet.  This problem is especially pronounced in the autonomous region of Gaugazia, one of Moldova’s poorest regions, and traditionally largely pro-Russian. 

Evghenia Guțul, the Governor of Gagauzia, was recently arrested for the alleged illegal transfer of Russian funds into Moldova. This only exacerbated existing tensions between Gagauzia and the central government in Chisinau. Guțul retains close ties to the Kremlin and a hostile attitude towards president Sandu and her party.

The Russian-backed socialists successfully appeal to the poorer parts of society as they offer a transactional relationship. In this climate, vote buying can flourish – as the money offered in exchange for a vote can act as immediate relief for some of the most vulnerable citizens. 

Vote-buying and 'protest-buying'

Due to the small population size and poor economic situation in many regions, Moldova is particularly vulnerable to vote-buying.

For last year's presidential elections and the EU referendum, it is now estimated that about 10% of total votes in Moldova have been corrupted – 138,000 votes. Voters were paid to vote against president Maia Sandu, and against enshrining the EU accession trajectory into the Moldovan constitution. 

For this month's elections, the government has stepped up efforts to counter electoral fraud, through widespread communications campaigns, as well as fines and arrests targeting figures involved in electoral corruption during the 2024 election.

According to President Sandu, already 25,000 people have been linked to electoral fraud in last year's elections and prosecuted. A person accused of selling their vote faces a fine ranging from 25,000 to 37,500 lei (roughly €1,290 to €1,930). This is a hefty fine compared to the average monthly salary in Moldova in 2024: 12,097 lei (€730).

Learning from past instances of Russian proxies organising sponsored protests, Moldova also introduced very strict rules around accepting payments for protest participation. Funding protesters is an overt method of fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor – who has recently encouraged Moldovans to set up tents and protest against the government, offering $3,000 to anyone who joins.  Such protests faced decisive action from the police, which has warned that those who received payment for participating in the protest will be fined up to 7,500 lei (about €380) per day.

Considering the government’s crackdown on vote-buying, there are fears that Russian actors have turned their attention to Transnistria – Moldova's breakaway region in the east over which the central government has no control – and that they will attempt large-scale vote-buying there, where Moldova cannot prosecute.

The problem of Transnistrian votes

Although Moldovan citizens of the separatist region Transnistria are eligible to vote in the parliamentary elections, since the Moldovan government does not control the territory, it is impossible to open polling stations there. Instead, dedicated polling stations for the population of Transnistria open on the right bank of the Dniester river.

There is an ongoing debate about the number of polling station required to cover the region. Pavel Postica, the head of Moldova’s electoral commission, has denied Transnistria’s request for 41 voting stations, saying only 10 will open. 

Map showing Moldova and its breakaway region Transnistria located between Romania and Ukraine. Image: ANP Graphics

Justifying the decision, he cited the latest trends of voters from Transnistria, assuring that 10 polling station will be sufficient to cover the voters' needs according to Moldova’s electoral code. He also voiced concerns about candidates’ inability to campaign on the left bank of the Dniester.

For comparison, for the 2024 presidential election, Moldova provided 30 polling stations for Transnistria – and for the 2019 election, a record of 47 polling stations. 

The issue is more complex and political – residents of Transnistria traditionally vote overwhelmingly for pro-Russian candidates. In Transnistria, Moldovans are also much more vulnerable to vote-buying and the Moldovan government has no means to prosecute, nor any means to prevent it. 

Moldova's future: avoiding Ukraine and Georgia scenarios

Despite Chisinau being located less than 200 kilometres from Odesa, fears of the war in Ukraine spilling over to Moldova seem to have mellowed down. 

The real risk to Moldova is the kind of democratic backsliding seen in what once used to be a promising EU candidate state – Georgia.

Russia has been working on the same scenario in Moldova: for an EU-sceptic and Russia-sympathetic party to secure a comfortable majority to sabotage the EU accession process and keep Moldova in the grey zone between East and West – close enough to Russia. 

Campaign tent of the Russia-sympathising Patriotic Electoral Bloc in Chisinau. Photo: Dumitru Doru / ANP / EPA

Although PAS is currently heading the polls, it is unlikely that they will secure enough seats to rule independently. In the polls, they are closely followed by the overtly Russia-sympathising Patriotic Electoral Bloc.

Lower in the charts, chipping away at PAS’s pro-European supporters is Bloc Alternativa, founded by Chisinau’s major, Ion Ceban.

The choice of other leading figures in Alternativa casts doubts on the pro-European direction of the bloc. Ceban was joined by Moldovan political figures known for their favourable view of Moscow, including former Prosecutor General Alexandr Stoianoglo, who was dismissed for failing to tackle corruption. Stoiangolo ran against Maia Sandu in last year's presidential elections and called for a 'reset' of relations with Russia.

Progress and poverty: communication is key

The disjointment between contending parties will make any coalition efforts difficult and could threaten the stability of any successive government. In a recent interview, Maia Sandu said that she does not envision any coalitions – that she either sees PAS getting a majority, or a departure from Moldova’s pro-European course. 

Maia Sandu and PAS have shown incredible resilience in the face of ongoing Russian interference in the country’s politics. Even a narrow victory in the presidential election, in the face of paid-for votes and economic fallout, demonstrated ongoing broad support for Moldova’s course. 

EU diplomacy does not impress the population when many struggle to stay afloat day to day

Since PAS’s coming to power, the number of people who believe that Moldova is heading in the right direction has been steadily increasing.

But in these elections, a decisive victory seems unlikely. The lesson is that to maintain widespread support for reforms, better communication with society is needed – including clearly attributable results. High-level EU diplomacy does not impress the population when many struggle to stay afloat day to day.